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Abstract—Advent of prosumers helps to pave the way towards
a more flexible and sustainable power grid, but also exerts great
challenges on system management. Traditional centralized opera-
tion paradigms may become impracticable due to computational
burden, privacy violation, and interest inconsistency. In this
paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate
prosumers’ strategic decision-making on their self-production
and demand considering capacity constraints. Under this setting,
prosumers constitute a generalized Nash game. We prove main
properties of the game: its equilibrium exists and is partially
unique; no prosumer is worse off by energy sharing; a 1−O(1/I)
price-of-anarchy (PoA) is achieved (which is less than 1 because
net cost is negative in this paper). Specially, the PoA tends to 1
with growing number of prosumers, meaning that the resulting
total cost under the proposed energy sharing approaches social
optimum. We prove that the corresponding prosumers’ strategies
converge to the social optimal solution as well. A bidding process
is presented for implementation, which is proved to converge to
the energy sharing equilibrium under mild conditions. Illustrative
examples are tested to validate the results.
Index Terms—Energy sharing, generalized Nash equilibrium,
prosumer, bidding algorithm, distributed mechanism
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices, Sets, and Functions
i,I Index and set of prosumers.
Si Action sets of prosumer i, and S =∏i∈I Si.
fi(pi) Cost function of prosumer i.
ui(di) Utility function of prosumer i
Ji(pi,di) Net cost of prosumer i, which equals to fi(pi)−
ui(di); and J(p,d) = ∑i∈I Ji(pi,di).
Γi(p,d,b) Total net cost of prosumer i with sharing, which
equals to fi(pi)−ui(di)+λ (−aλ +bi).
PoA(G) Price of anarchy of a game G.
Yi Any (pi,di)∈Yi satisfies the capacity constraint.
B. Parameters
I Number of prosumers.
pi, pi Lower/upper bound of prosumer i’s production.
di,di Lower/upper bound of prosumer i’s demand.
a Energy sharing market sensitivity.
C. Decision Variables
pi Production of prosumer i.
di Demand of prosumer i.
λm Dual variable of the power balancing condition.
λ Energy sharing price.
qi Amount of energy prosumer i gets from sharing.
bi Bid of prosumer i in the energy sharing market.
p˜i, d˜i Optimal strategies under centralized paradigm.
p∗i ,d∗i Strategy of prosumer i at sharing equilibrium.
pˇi, dˇi Strategy of prosumer i under self-sufficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, distributed generation technologies andstorages have developed rapidly. In the US, over 81,000
distributed wind turbines with a cumulative capacity of 1,076
MW had been deployed during 2003-2017 [1]. The residential
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels had risen from 3,700 MW
to 150,000 MW from 2004 to 2014 [2]. Advances in these
technologies, together with decline in cost, have encouraged
traditional consumers to produce and storage energy at home,
via distributed energy resources (DERs), electrical vehicles,
and batteries [3], turning them into so-called “prosumers”.
By reevaluating their energy, prosumers can play a proactive
role in energy management. However, massive participants,
asymmetric information, and interest conflicts also impose
great challenges [3]. The “prosumer” era is calling for an
engrained revolution in the power grid.
Typically there are three types of prosumer management
paradigms as shown in Fig. 1 [4]. The first one (on the
left of Fig. 1) adopts a centralized manner [5]. The operator
of a microgrid or a virtual power plant (VPP) gathers all
information and makes a central decision, aiming at mini-
mizing the total net costs of all prosumers inside it. Then
dispatch orders are sent to each prosumer to execute. Since
the number of prosumers is increasing rapidly, the traditional
centralized manner becomes impracticable both in computa-
tional burden and privacy requirements. The second one (in
the middle of Fig. 1) uses a market structure similar to the
retail market. The operator announces a price, based on which
every prosumer, as a price taker, decides how much energy to
consume/produce/buy/sell [6]. It is hard to decide an effective
energy price especially with massive prosumers, since private
information may be needed and each prosumer’s capacity is
too small to be observed. Inspired by the concept of “sharing”
in other sectors, the third type of paradigm (on the right of Fig.
1) has captured increasing attention in recent decades. Here,
a prosumer is allowed to exchange/share energy with other
prosumers, and they are turning from price-takers to price-
makers. This can be done in a peer-to-peer (P2P) structure
[7] or with the assistance of a platform [8]. As revealed in
[9], energy sharing can be a promising direction in managing
prosumers, since it can achieve a nearly social optimal in
a distributed manner. Various research projects have been
carried out on related issues, such as Piclo [10] in the UK,
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Fig. 1. Prosumer management paradigms.
TransActive Grid [11] in the US, and Enexa [12] in South
Australia. The successful operation of energy sharing relies
on a well-designed mechanism, and existing research about
energy sharing mechanism design can be classified into two
categories:
Cooperative game based approach. In this category, first
a profit distribution scheme is designed, and then each pro-
sumer chooses its strategy taking into account the possible
reallocation it might obtain. The key point here is to design an
effective distribution scheme so that all prosumers are willing
to collaborate to achieve a certain goal (usually social optimal).
Profit distribution schemes for storage sharing were developed
under two scenarios [13], [14]. Incentives were designed
to encourage coalitional operation of networked microgrids
[15]. A mathematical program with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC) was used for DER sharing among prosumers, and
the coordination surplus was split among the aggregator and
prosumers [16]. A random sampling method was proposed to
estimate the Shapley value of a P2P energy sharing game [17].
The trading mechanism with Shapley value was compared with
three traditional mechanisms, i.e., bill sharing, mid-market
rate, and supply-demand ratio [18]. The cooperative game
based energy sharing can achieve a desired equilibrium with
proper distribution rules. However, these rules are usually
case-by-case, and may require prosumers’ private information,
and therefore may be hard to implement.
Noncooperative game based approach. This category char-
acterizes the interest inconsistency among prosumers, and can
be further divided into bilateral contract based approach and
auction based approach. Under the bilateral contract based
paradigm, trading offers are posted and handshakes are made.
First, each prosumer is registered as a seller or a buyer. Then,
during the trading periods, both the sellers and buyers put
forward several offers and try to find the best match. Once
a contract is approved by the operator, the corresponding
offers are removed [19]. This mechanism allows sharing to
be performed in an asynchronous manner. A key feature of
the bilateral contract based paradigm is scalability in terms
of both the outcomes and the process to reach them. A
bilateral contract network with forward and real-time markets
was developed in [20]. Reference [21] presented a matching
algorithm for microgrid prosumers with minimum risk of
mismatch. There are relatively few analytical works based on
bilateral contracts, because the matching procedure of bilateral
contracts is hard to characterize [22]. Under the auction based
paradigm, some or all of the prosumers first bid on energy,
and then the market is cleared with the energy sharing prices
determined. An evolutionary game was used to model the
dynamics of buyers selecting sellers [23]. A Nash bargaining
model was adopted in [24] to address the charge sharing
among electric vehicles (EVs). In above works, the role of
a prosumer as a buyer or a seller is predetermined and cannot
change during the bidding process, which limits the flexibility
of sharing. To overcome this limit, distributed peer-to-peer
energy exchange was modeled as a generalized Nash game
in [25], which proved that the set of variational equilibria
coincides with the set of social optima. In our previous work
[8], a generalized demand-bidding approach was proposed for
node-level energy sharing, and several properties of the Nash
equilibrium were proved. This paper extends [8] and makes
three major contributions:
1) Model: A generalized Nash game model is proposed to
depict the energy sharing among prosumers. Extending [8],
in which only power balance constraint was considered with
fixed energy demand, this paper incorporates capacity limits
and variable demand, which is more flexible and practical.
This complicates the analyses in two ways: Firstly, the energy
sharing model in this paper can no longer be simplified to
a standard Nash game as in [8], but indeed is a generalized
Nash game whose equilibrium is hard to characterize [26].
Secondly, when analyzing each prosumer’s strategic behavior,
the complementary slackness conditions associated with the
inequality constraints exert great challenges.
2) Equilibrium: Main properties of the proposed energy
sharing game are proved. The generalized Nash equilibrium
(GNE) exists and is partially unique (explained later). A Pareto
improvement is reached among all prosumers, which justifies
the incentives for them to participate in sharing. Moreover, the
energy sharing game achieves a 1−O(1/I) price-of-anarchy
(PoA) (which is less than 1 because net cost is negative in this
paper). With more and more prosumers, the PoA approaches
1, meaning that the performance of energy sharing approaches
the centralized social optimal operation. The corresponding
prosumers’ strategies also converge to the centralized social
optimal strategies.
3) Algorithm: A bidding process is developed for achieving
energy sharing in a distributed manner. A range of sharing
market sensitivity is given, within which the bidding process is
proved to converge to a GNE, using the variational inequality
technique. This can provide some guidance for designing and
implementing energy sharing in the future.
Notation. We use x :=(xi, i∈I)T to denote a collection of xi
in a set I. The subscript −i means all components in I except
i. The Cartesian product of sets Si is denoted as ∏i∈I Si. We
use f˙ (.) to denote the first derivative of function f (.), and f¨ (.)
to denote the second derivative. ( f )−1(.) denotes the inverse
function of f (.).
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
A. Problem Description
In a standalone microgrid, there are I prosumers, indexed
by i ∈ I = {1,2, ..., I}. Each of them can both produce and
consume. Prosumer i’s production is pi with cost function
fi(pi), which is strictly convex and twice differentiable; its
demand is di with the utility function ui(di), which is strictly
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concave and twice differentiable. It is reasonable to assume
that f¨i and −u¨i are uniformly bounded over all i ∈ I where
both the upper and lower bounds are strictly positive and
independent from I. Traditionally, the operator manages all
prosumers in a centralized manner by solving (1).
min
pi,di,∀i∈I
I
∑
i=1
[ fi(pi)−ui(di)] (1a)
s.t.
I
∑
i=1
pi−
I
∑
i=1
di = 0 : λm (1b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi,∀i ∈ I (1c)
di ≤ di ≤ di,∀i ∈ I (1d)
The objective (1a) is to minimize prosumers’ total net
cost (cost minus utility). Denote Ji(pi,di) := fi(pi)− ui(di)
and J(p,d) = ∑i∈I Ji(pi,di). Constraint (1b) represents the
microgrid-wide power balance with its dual variable λm,
and capacity constraints are in (1c)-(1d). Here, pi and pi
are the lower and upper bound of prosumer i’s production,
respectively; di and di are the lower and upper bound of its
demand, respectively. This centralized paradigm can achieve
the lowest total net cost, and is used as a benchmark.
Throughout the paper, we assume that:
A1: {(p,d) : s.t. (1b)− (1d) are satisfied.} 6= /0
Condition A1 means the feasible set of problem (1) is
not empty. Since J(p,d) is strictly convex, (1) has a unique
optimal solution, which is denoted as (p˜, d˜). At the optimal
point, the value of dual variable λ˜m is the “shadow price”
in economics, showing the increment of total net cost would
there be one more unit total production-demand mismatch.
Remark: Though problem (1) has a unique optimal solu-
tion, the corresponding λ˜m is not necessarily unique. Specif-
ically, if there exists at least one i ∈ I that satisfies either
(1c) or (1d) strictly, λ˜m is unique. Similar discussion about the
uniqueness of locational marginal price (LMP) can be found in
[27]. λ˜m reflects the value of production-demand balance in a
microgrid (the higher it is, the more important it is to balance
production and demand). Later we will show that when the
number of prosumer increases, the energy sharing price under
the proposed mechanism converges to λ˜m.
B. Practical Issues and Requirements
Although centralized management of prosumers can achieve
the lowest total net cost, it encounters two main difficulties
in practice: 1) it would be time-consuming when there are
massive prosumers; 2) some information including fi(.), ui(.)
is hard to obtain due to customers’ protection of their own
privacy. To tackle these challenges, a distributed and scalable
paradigm is desired, which needs to be:
For process: 1) Private. Prosumer privacy is preserved. 2)
Distributed. Each prosumer makes its own decision according
to individual rationality. 3) Convergent. The bidding process
can converge within finite steps.
For result: 1) Incentive. Prosumers are willing to participate,
and more participants lead to better performance. 2) Effective.
The result satisfies physical constraints. 3) Meaningful. The
price reflects the value of production-demand balance. 4)
Flexible. Prosumer’s role as a seller or buyer is endogenously
given instead of predetermined. 5) Economical. The resulting
total cost should be as low as possible, and close to that under
social optimum.
To meet the requirements above, in this paper, an energy
sharing mechanism is proposed to facilitate energy exchange
among prosumers. The basic setting of the proposed energy
sharing is developed in Section III, which can be characterized
as a generalized Nash game. Main properties of the sharing
game equilibrium (a general Nash equilibrium) are revealed.
The bidding process is described in detail in Section IV with
proof of its convergence. Simulations are shown in Section
V to support our results. Finally, we conclude our work in
Section VI.
III. ENERGY SHARING GAME
A. Basic Setting
Instead of dispatching prosumers in a centralized manner,
we allow each prosumer to make decision individually to
maintain self-energy-balancing. Meanwhile, to be more flexi-
ble, these prosumers can participate in an energy sharing mar-
ket to exchange energy with each other. The market clearing
price is λ , and the amount of energy that prosumer i gets is
qi. If qi > 0, prosumer i buys from the market and pays λqi;
otherwise, it sells to the market and receives−λqi. The sharing
framework is shown in Fig. 2. Each prosumer is connected to a
platform via a smart meter through a bidirectional information
channel. The information flow is as follows.
 
Fig. 2. Framework of energy sharing between prosumers and platform.
Step 1: (Initialization) Each prosumer i enters its private
parameters fi(.), ui(.), pi, pi, di, di to its smart meter i. Set
λ 1 = 0, and k = 1. Choose tolerance ε .
Step 2: Each smart meter i updates its bid bk+1i based on
the latest λ k, and sends it to the platform.
Step 3: After receiving all bids bk+1i ,∀i ∈ I, the platform
updates price λ k+1 and sends it back to all smart meters.
Step 4: If |λ k − λ k+1| ≤ ε , λ ∗ = λ k+1, go to Step 5;
otherwise, k = k+1 and go to Step 2.
Step 5: Each smart meter determines the optimal production
p∗i , demand d∗i , sharing quantiy q∗i based on λ ∗, and sends
them back to the corresponding prosumer to execute.
Details about bid and price updates will be explained
in Section IV. The key of sharing mechanism design is to
determine the sharing price λ and quantity qi,∀i ∈ I based
on prosumers’ bids bi,∀i ∈ I. Here we use the generalized
demand (or supply) function [28] to depict the relationship
between qi and λ as
qi =−aλ +bi, ∀i ∈ I (2)
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where a> 0 is a parameter reflecting the energy sharing market
sensitivity, and bi is prosumer i’s bid. Market clearing requires
∑i∈I qi = 0. Therefore, the energy sharing price is
λ = ∑i∈I
bi
aI
. (3)
Under this setting, the total net cost of prosumer i equals its
self-production cost, minus its utility, and plus the payment for
buying from (or minus the revenue from selling to) the energy
sharing market, denoted as Γi(p,d,b) := fi(pi) − ui(di) +
λ (b)(−aλ (b) + bi). Its energy needs to be self-balanced,
which means pi−aλ (b)+bi = di. So each prosumer i solves:
min
pi,di,bi
fi(pi)−ui(di)+λ (b)(−aλ (b)+bi) (4a)
s.t. pi−aλ (b)+bi = di (4b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi (4c)
di ≤ di ≤ di (4d)
λ (b) = ∑i∈I
bi
aI
(4e)
Due to the common constraint (4e), the proposed energy
sharing mechanism constitutes a generalized Nash game [26]
with the following elements: 1) a set of players I; 2) action
sets Si(p−i,d−i,b−i),∀i∈ I, and strategy space S=∏i∈I Si; 3)
cost function Γi(p,d,b),∀i ∈ I. For simplicity, we denote the
sharing game compactly as G = {I,S,Γ}. Different from the
standard Nash game, the action set Si of player i depends on
the strategies of other players, making its equilibrium (defined
below) difficult to compute and analyze.
Definition 1. A profile (pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) ∈ S is a generalized Nash
equilibrium (GNE) of the sharing game G, if ∀i ∈ I
(pˆi, dˆi, bˆi) ∈ argmin Γi(pi,di,bi, pˆ−i, dˆ−i, bˆ−i)
s.t. (4b)− (4e) (5)
B. Properties of the Sharing Equilibrium
In the following, three main properties of the equilibrium
of sharing game are revealed. Proposition 1 shows that an
effective market equilibrium that satisfies related constraints
always exists; Proposition 2 ensures that it is incentive enough
to attract prosumers; Proposition 3 tells that it can achieve a
near social optimal total cost, and is economical.
Proposition 1. (Existence and Partial Uniqueness) A GNE for
the sharing game G exists if and only if A1 holds. Moreover,
suppose a profile (pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) is a GNE, then (pˆ, dˆ) is the unique
optimal solution of:
min
pi,di,∀i∈I
I
∑
i=1
fi(pi)−
I
∑
i=1
ui(di)+
∑Ii=1(di− pi)2
2a(I−1) (6a)
s.t.
I
∑
i=1
pi =
I
∑
i=1
di : ζ (6b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi : δ±i ,∀i ∈ I (6c)
di ≤ di ≤ di : κ±i ,∀i ∈ I (6d)
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix A.
It reveals that if the centralized problem (1) is feasible, a
GNE for the energy sharing game exists and we can migrate
from centralized to distributed mechanisms without sacrificing
feasibility. The energy sharing price λ equals the “shadow
price” ζ of problem (6). Unlike the unique Nash equilibrium
in [8], the GNE here is partially unique. In particular, the
self-production pi and demand di for all i ∈ I are unique,
but there can be multiple combinations of prosumer bids bi
to achieve the same (p,d). Different bids b may result in
different energy sharing price λ , which in turn influences the
payment or revenue of each prosumer. Regardless of difference
in bids, prosumers always have incentives to take part in
energy sharing, as shown by the next proposition.
Specifically, Proposition 2 states that each prosumer’s net
cost under GNE is not worse than that under self-sufficiency,
i.e., the solution of:
min
pi,di
fi(pi)−ui(di) (7a)
s.t. pi = di (7b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi (7c)
di ≤ di ≤ di (7d)
The second condition we assume is:
A2: {(pi,di) : s.t. (7b)− (7d) are satisfied.} 6= /0,∀i ∈ I
When Condition A2 holds, problem (7) is feasible and has
a unique optimal solution. Denote the optimal solution of (7)
as (pˇi, dˇi) for all i ∈ I and we further assume that
A3: Ji(pˇi, dˇi)< 0,∀i ∈ I
Condition A3 means that under self-sufficiency, each pro-
sumer can get a negative net cost, i.e., positive net utility,
which is reasonable.
Proposition 2. (Pareto improvement) Suppose A2 holds, and
(pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) is a GNE of the sharing game G. We have
Ji(pˇi, dˇi)≥ Γi(pˆ, dˆ, bˆ),∀i (8)
Moreover, strictly inequality holds for at least one prosumer i
unless (pˇ, dˇ) = (pˆ, dˆ).
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix B.
The proposed energy sharing game can incentivize prosumers
to join since at least one prosumer can benefit from sharing
while no prosumer is worse off. A rare special case is that the
self-sufficient solution coincides with the energy sharing equi-
librium (in which case it also coincides with the centralized
social optimal for problem (1)).
Although every prosumer has the motivation to share energy,
there is still a gap in terms of the total net cost between
energy sharing (4) and the centralized mechanism (1). The next
proposition characterizes this gap by calculating the price-of-
anarchy defined as follows.
Definition 2. (Price of Anarchy, PoA [29]) Consider a game
G = {I,S,Γ}. Let a subset Seq ⊆ S be the set of strategies in
equilibrium, then the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the game is
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defined as the ratio of the total net cost between the worst
equilibrium and the social optimal solution, i.e.
PoA(G) :=
maxs∈Seq
I
∑
i=1
Γi(s)
mins∈S
I
∑
i=1
Γi(s)
(9)
Note that the PoA measures how the overall efficiency
degrades due to the strategic behavior of participants in a
game. If the PoA equals to 1, it means that the game can
achieve a social optimal outcome.
Proposition 3. (Tendency) Suppose A1–A3 hold, and pi,
pi, di, di, fi(.), ui(.) over all i ∈ I are uniformly bounded
by numbers independent from prosumer number I. Given I,
let (pˆ(I), dˆ(I), bˆ(I)) be a GNE of the sharing game G, and
(p˜(I), d˜(I)) be the unique optimal solution of (1). We have
PoA(G) = J
(
pˆ(I), dˆ(I)
)
J
(
p˜(I), d˜(I)
) ≥ 1− C
I−1 (10)
where C is a constant. Moreover, we have
lim
I→∞
|pˆi(I)− p˜i(I)|= lim
I→∞
∣∣dˆi(I)− d˜i(I)∣∣= 0, ∀i ∈ I. (11)
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix C.
It is worth noting that, PoA is conventionally larger than
1 since a positive minimum total cost is achieved at social
optimal [29]. However, by A3 and Proposition 2, the total
net cost is consistently negative across our self-sufficiency,
energy sharing, and centralized social optimal mechanisms,
which renders PoA less than 1. Proposition 3 shows that the
total net cost and prosumer strategies under GNE converge to
those under the centralized social optimal mechanism, as more
prosumers are involved.
IV. BIDDING PROCESS
Three properties of the energy sharing game are revealed
above. To achieve such a desired equilibrium, a practical
bidding process is presented in this section, and the range of
the market sensitivity a that can guarantee market convergence
is given. The economic intuition behind Proposition 3 is also
explained from another perspective.
A. Procedure
The procedure of the bidding process is shown in Algo-
rithm 1. The key of the algorithm lies in how each prosumer
updates its bid without knowing other prosumers’ information.
First, as in Fig. 2, at (k+1)th iteration, each prosumer i ∈ I
utilizes the up-to-date price λ k to estimate (due to the fact that
λ (p,d) is not known exactly) its optimal solution for problem
(4) which is equivalent to:
min
pi,di
fi(pi)−ui(di)+λ (p,d)(di− pi) (12a)
s.t. pi ≤ pi ≤ pi (12b)
di ≤ di ≤ di (12c)
Denote this estimated optimal solution as (pk+1i ,d
k+1
i ), and
the updated bid of prosumer i is bk+1i := d
k+1
i − pk+1i + aλ k
Algorithm 1: Energy Sharing Bidding
Input: input parameters fi(.), ui(.), pi, pi, di,di into each
smart meter i, tolerance ε .
Output: energy sharing results p∗,d∗,b∗,λ ∗.
Initialization: λ 1 = 0, k = 0;
repeat
iteration k++
prosumer update:
for i = 1; i≤ I do
(pk+1i ,d
k+1
i ) solves problem (15)
bk+1i := d
k+1
i − pk+1i +aλ k
end
platform update:
λ k+1 := ∑
I
i=1 b
k+1
i
aI
until |λ k+1−λ k| ≤ ε;
at (k+1)th iteration. Denote the feasible set of problem (12)
as Yi. To obtain the estimated optimal solution above, instead
of simply replacing the term λ (p,d)(di− pi) with λ k(di− pi),
prosumer i incorporates the predicted impact of its decision
(pk+1i ,d
k+1
i ) on price λ (p,d), by taking the partial derivative
of λ (p,d)(di− pi) over pi (similarly for di):
∂λ (p,d)(di− pi)
∂ pi
∣∣∣
λ=λ k
=
[
∂λ (p,d)
∂ pi
(di− pi)−λ (p,d)
]∣∣∣
λ=λ k
= − di− pi
(I−1)a −λ
k (13)
where the last equality is because of
λ (p,d) =
(di− pi)+∑ j 6=i b j
(I−1)a
derived from (4b) and (4e). Thus we can get the following
objective function as an estimate of (12a), where λ k is treated
as a constant.
fi(pi)−ui(di)+ (di− pi)
2
2a(I−1) +λ
k(di− pi) (14)
Therefore, solving problem (12) is converted to solving:
min
pi,di
(14), ∀(pi,di) ∈ Yi,∀i ∈ I (15)
After receiving all updated bids bk+1i ,∀i ∈ I, the platform
updates the energy sharing price as:
λ k+1 := ∑
I
i=1 b
k+1
i
aI
(16)
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B. Convergence
Apart from the design of the bidding process, its conver-
gence is also a major concern. Here we give a range of market
sensitivity a in Condition A4, and prove that Algorithm 1
converges under such a condition.
A4: For all i in I, a satisfies
a≥ 2I−4
I−1 sup
{
1
f¨i(pi)
,− 1
u¨i(di)
, ∀(pi,di) ∈ Yi, ∀i ∈ I
}
Proposition 4. When A1, A4 hold, Algorithm 1 converges
to a GNE of the energy sharing game G.
Before proving convergence of the bidding process, we first
give the following lemma with its proof in Appendix D. For
conciseness, denote yi = [pi,di]T , y = [yT1 , . . . ,y
T
I ]
T , and Y =
∏i∈I Yi. Let h∈R1×2I be a vector with h2i−1 = 1 and h2i =−1
for all i = 1 · · · I. Let
φ(y) :=
I
∑
i=1
fi(pi)−
I
∑
i=1
ui(di)+
I
∑
i=1
(di− pi)2
2a(I−1) −
(
I
∑
i=1
di−
I
∑
i=1
pi)2
2aI
and L(y,λ ) := φ(y)−λhy with dom L = Y ×R.
Lemma 1. When A4 holds, φ(y) is a convex function, and
L(y,λ ) has a (not necessarily unique) saddle point.
With Lemma 1, in the following we prove Proposition 4
using variational inequality technique.
Proof. Given λ k, subsititute the update of bi,∀i ∈ I into the
update of λ , the k-th iteration is equivalent to:
yk+1i = argmin{(14)|yi ∈ Yi},∀i ∈ I (17)
λ k+1 = λ k− hy
k+1
aI
(18)
Equation (17) can be further represented as
yk+1 = argmin{φ(y)−λ khy+ 1
2aI
yT hT hy|y ∈ Y} (19)
Utilizing variational inequality and convexity of φ(.), yk+1 ∈
Y generated by (19) satisfies
∀y ∈ Y, φ(y)−φ(yk+1)
+(y− yk+1)T
{
−λ khT + 1
aI
hT (hyk+1)
}
≥ 0 (20)
Substitute (18) into (20), we can get
∀y ∈ Y,φ(y)−φ(yk+1)+(y− yk+1)T (−λ k+1hT )≥ 0 (21)
Combining (21) and (18) gives the following inequality:(
y− yk+1
λ −λ k+1
)T {( −λ k+1hT
hyk+1
)
+
(
0
aI(λ k+1−λ k)
)}
+φ(y)−φ(yk+1)≥ 0,∀(y,λ ) ∈ Y ×R (22)
According to Lemma 1, let (yˆ, λˆ ) be a saddle point of
L(y,λ ), then we have ∀(y,λ ) ∈ Y ×R
φ(y)−φ(yˆ)+
(
y− yˆ
λ − λˆ
)T
F(yˆ, λˆ )≥ 0 (23)
where the mapping F(y,λ ) := [−λh,hy]T and is monotone. 1
Since (22) holds for all (y,λ ) in Y×R, and particularly for
(yˆ, λˆ ), we have
(λ k+1− λˆ )(λ k−λ k+1)
≥ 1
aI

(
yk+1− yˆ
λ k+1− λˆ
)T
F(yk+1,λ k+1)+φ(yk+1)−φ(yˆ)

(24)
and similarly for (23) we have
φ(yk+1)−φ(yˆ)+
(
yk+1− yˆ
λ k+1− λˆ
)T
F(yˆ, λˆ )≥ 0 (25)
By monotonicity of mapping F , we have
(λ k+1− λˆ )(λ k−λ k+1)≥ 0 (26)
which implies
|λ k+1− λˆ |2 ≤ |λ k− λˆ |2−|λ k−λ k+1|2 (27)
For every saddle point (yˆ, λˆ ) inequality (27) holds. Denote
the set of λˆ as W . The term |λ k − λˆ |2 decreases in each
iteration by an amount |λ k−λ k+1|2, so the sequence {|λ k−
λˆ |2} converges and the sequence {λ k} is bounded. With (22)
we know that every cluster point of {λ k} belongs to W . With
(27), the sequence {λ k} only has one cluster point, and thus
{λ k} converges to a point λˆ ∈W . Substitute λˆ into (17), we
can get pk→ pˆ, dk→ dˆ, and thus bk→ bˆ.
It is worth noting that the saddle point (yˆ, λˆ ) of L(y,λ )
corresponds to a primal-dual optimal of problem (6). Since
problem (6) has a unique primal optimal (p∗,d∗), we have
pˆ= p∗, dˆ = d∗; moreover, λˆ = ζ ∗ is a dual optimal. Therefore,
(p∗,d∗, bˆ) is a GNE of the energy sharing game.
Proposition 4 confirms that if parameter a is chosen to
meet Condition A4, the proposed bidding process converges
to a GNE of the sharing game. It hence offers a guidance
for implementing the proposed sharing mechanism. We can
also know that the sequence {λ k} converges to the “shadow
price” ζ ∗ of problem (6), and as indicated in the proof of
Proposition 3, ζ ∗ approaches λ˜m when I → ∞. Therefore,
the energy sharing price can reflect the value of production-
demand balance and is meaningful.
Remark: With the bidding process presented in this section,
we can give an economic explanation for Proposition 3. In
each iteration, each prosumer updates its bid considering the
impact of its strategy (pi,di) on the price λ as in (13). When
I is small, all prosumers constitute a monopolistic competition
market, and the impact of each prosumer’s strategy on price
cannot be neglected. But when I is large enough, it turns into
a perfectly competitive market, in which the influence of each
1A mapping F(λ ,y) is monotone if and only if ∀(y1,λ1),(y2,λ2)∈Y×R,
we have (
y1− y2
λ1−λ2
)T
(F(y1,λ1)−F(y2,λ2))≥ 0
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prosumer is infinitesimal and thus the price λ can be regarded
as exogenously given. In other words, now (13) becomes
∂λ (di− pi)
∂ pi
|λ=λ k =−λ k (28)
Following a similar procedure to the proof of Proposition 4,
we can show that as I→ ∞, the bidding process converges to
the optimal solution of problem (1), which is the last statement
of Proposition 3.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, numerical experiments are conducted to
support our theoretical results. First, a simple case with three
prosumers is used to verify the convergence of the bidding
process and the effectiveness of the GNE.
A. Simple Example with Three Prosumers
A simple case with three prosumers is tested. The cost func-
tion is chosen as fi(.) := α1i p2i +α2i pi, and the utility function
as ui(.) := β 1i d2i + β 2i di, where α1i ,α2i ,β 1i ,β 2i ,∀i ∈ {1,2,3}.
Market sensitivity is set at a = 100 and other parameters are
provided in TABLE I–II. The bidding process in Section IV
is used to seek GNE. The pki ,d
k
i ,λ k in each iteration are
shown in Fig. 3. We observe that prosumer strategies and the
energy sharing price converge after 6 iterations. At the GNE,
the production and demand of a prosumer are not necessarily
equal, where the gap is the amount of energy it buys from or
sells to the energy sharing market.
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Fig. 3. Prosumers’ strategies and sharing price in each iteration
The (p∗,d∗) at GNE, the social optimal solution (p˜, d˜) for
the centralized problem (1), and the self-sufficient strategy
(pˇ, dˇ) that solves problem (7) are compared in TABLE III.
The net costs of all prosumers are negative, meaning that
they have positive net utility, so that Condition A3 is met. All
prosumers can benefit (or at least retain the same net utility)
by participating in energy sharing. Specifically, prosumer 1’s
net utility increases from $ 6.25 to $ 6.90, prosumer 2 from
TABLE I
COST COEFFICIENTS OF PROSUMERS
α1i α2i β 1i β 2i
Prosumer ($/kWh2) ($/kWh) ($/kWh2) ($/kWh)
1 0.015 0.038 -0.008 0.8
2 0.008 0.047 -0.014 0.5
3 0.011 0.056 -0.009 0.4
TABLE II
PHYSICAL LIMITS OF PROSUMERS
Prosumer pi(kWh) pi(kWh) di(kWh) di(kWh)
1 0 20 5 15
2 0 25 7 18
3 0 30 10 25
$ 2.33 to $ 2.59, and prosumer 3 remains the same. This
verifies Proposition 2. The centralized social optimal solution
achieves the highest total net utility $ 10.98. The relative
gap between this social optimal and GNE is only (10.98-
10.94)/10.98=0.36%, verifying efficiency of the energy sharing
mechanism.
TABLE III
COST COEFFICIENTS OF PROSUMERS
Prosumer (p∗,d∗) (p˜, d˜) (pˇ, dˇ)
1 (9.3,15.0) (8.1,15.0) (15.0,15.0)
Net cost($) -6.90 -8.91 -6.25
2 (13.6,8.4) (14.6,7.8) (10.3,10.3)
Net cost($) -2.59 -0.68 -2.33
3 (10.5,10.0) (10.2,10.0) (10.0, 10.0)
Net cost($) -1.44 -1.39 -1.44
Total net cost ($) -10.94 -10.98 -10.03
B. Cases with More Prosumers
Simulation with a larger case consisting of 50 pro-
sumers is used to show the scalability of the proposed bid-
ding process. Parameters of prosumers are randomly cho-
sen within given ranges: α1i ∈ [0.01,0.02], α2i ∈ [0.02,0.08],
β 1i ∈ [−0.01,−0.005], β 2i ∈ [0,1], pi ∈ [20,40], di ∈ [5,10],
di ∈ [15,30], and pi is set to zero, ∀i ∈ {1,2,3}. We change
the value of a, and test the case under a= 25, a= 50, a= 75,
a = 100, and a = 125. With randomly chosen parameters, the
change of energy sharing price under each a corresponds to a
line in Fig. 4. We can find that: when a is too small (a = 25),
Condition A4 is violated and the bidding process fails to
converge; but for other cases, the energy sharing price always
converges after 8 iterations, showing the practicability of the
proposed bidding process. It is worth noting that, even though
the bidding process converges when a= 50,75,100,125, Con-
dition A4 is not always met. In other words, Condition A4 is
just a sufficient condition but not a necessary condition.
Then, we test the performance of the proposed energy
sharing mechanism with growing number of prosumers. In-
crease the number of prosumers from 2 to 50 with parameters
randomly chosen within above ranges and fix a= 100. Change
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Fig. 4. Change of sharing price under different a.
of the PoA given in (10) is recorded. We repeat this process
for five times and get five lines shown in Fig. 5. The PoAs
always converge to 1, validating Proposition 3.
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Fig. 5. Price of Anarchy (PoA) under increasing I.
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Fig. 6. Change of performance of energy sharing with prosumer diversity.
We further investigate how prosumer diversity would influ-
ence the outcome of energy sharing. The number of prosumers
is fixed to 100. At the beginning, all prosumers have the same
parameters, including the cost function, the utility function, the
upper/lower bounds pi, pi,di,di,∀i ∈ I. Then, we gradually
add some diversity to the testing group by increasing the
number of prosumer types. Fifty (50) random scenarios are
tested for each degree of diversity, and the mean and variance
of the relative cost difference between self-sufficiency and
energy sharing cases are plotted in Fig.6. The mean increases
with growing diversity, showing that sharing exhibits growing
potential for cost savings. The variance of relative cost differ-
ence becomes smaller when there are more types of prosumers,
implying that the performance of sharing is more stable. Both
results demonstrate that adding diversity to prosumers can
improve the performance of sharing.
VI. CONCLUSION
To invoke prosumers’ flexibility, a distributed and scalable
paradigm for energy sharing is proposed in this paper. A
prosumer only needs to send a bid to the platform without
revealing private information, and with its tradeoff between
production and demand as well as capacity constraint fully
considered. The energy sharing among prosumers is modeled
as a generalized Nash game, whose equilibrium exists and
is partially unique. At equilibrium, a Pareto improvement is
achieved so that every prosumer has the incentive to participate
in sharing. By analyzing the price-of-anarchy (PoA), we
proved that the performance of energy sharing approaches the
centralized social optimal solution with an increasing number
of prosumers. A practicable bidding process is presented and
its convergence condition is given. This paper provides insights
into market mechanism design in a prosumer era. Future
directions include incorporating renewable uncertainties, con-
sidering bounded rationality, and characterizing how big data
may help improve the performance of energy sharing.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Given b¯ j, j 6= i, prosumer i’s problem (4) can be rewritten
as (A.1) by using p,d to represent λ , bi.
min
pi,di
fi(pi)−ui(di)+
(di− pi)+∑ j 6=i b¯ j
(I−1)a (di− pi) (A.1a)
s.t. pi ≤ pi ≤ pi : µ±i (A.1b)
di ≤ di ≤ di : η±i (A.1c)
and the optimal bi is given by
bi = di− pi+
di− pi+∑ j 6=i b¯ j
I−1 (A.2)
The Hessian matrix of (A.1a) is[
f¨i(pi)+ 2(I−1)a − 2(I−1)a
− 2(I−1)a −u¨i(di)+ 2(I−1)a
]
 0
So problem (A.1) is a strictly convex optimization problem,
and its KKT condition (A.3) is the necessary and sufficient
condition for the optimal solution.
f˙i(pi)−
2(di− pi)+∑ j 6=i b¯ j
(I−1)a −µ
−
i +µ
+
i = 0 (A.3a)
−u˙i(di)+
2(di− pi)+∑ j 6=i b¯ j
(I−1)a −η
−
i +η
+
i = 0 (A.3b)
0≤ µ−i ⊥ (pi− pi)≥ 0 (A.3c)
0≤ µ+i ⊥ (pi− pi)≥ 0 (A.3d)
0≤ η−i ⊥ (di−di)≥ 0 (A.3e)
0≤ η+i ⊥ (di−di)≥ 0 (A.3f)
Then, a profile (pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) is a GNE of G if and only if ∀i∈ I,
there exists µ±i ,η
±
i , such that (pˆi, dˆi) together with µ
±
i ,η
±
i
satisfies (A.3) (where b j is replaced by bˆ j), and bˆ satisfies:
bˆi = dˆi− pˆi+
dˆi− pˆi+∑ j 6=i bˆ j
I−1 ,∀i ∈ I (A.4)
Problem (6) is also a strictly convex optimization problem
with the KKT condition as in (A.5).
f˙i(pi)− di− pi
(I−1)a −ζ −δ
−
i +δ
+
i = 0,∀i ∈ I (A.5a)
−u˙i(di)+ di− pi
(I−1)a +ζ −κ
−
i +κ
+
i = 0,∀i ∈ I (A.5b)
I
∑
i=1
pi =
I
∑
i=1
di (A.5c)
0≤ δ−i ⊥ (pi− pi)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (A.5d)
0≤ δ+i ⊥ (pi− pi)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (A.5e)
0≤ κ−i ⊥ (di−di)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (A.5f)
0≤ κ+i ⊥ (di−di)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (A.5g)
Suppose a profile (pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) is a GNE of G, and µˆ±i , ηˆ±i ,∀i∈I
are the corresponding dual variables, such that (A.3), (A.4) are
met. Obviously, (1c) and (1d) are satisfied. Summing up (A.4)
for all i gives equation (1b). Thus, A1 holds.
Denote
ζi =
dˆi− pˆi+∑ j 6=i bˆ j
(I−1)a ,∀i (A.6)
Condition (A.4) indicates that ∀i ∈ I, dˆi− pˆi− bˆi are equal,
and ζi are equal. Let ζ := ζi,∀i∈ I, δ±i = µˆ±i , κ±i = ηˆ±i . Then
(pˆ, dˆ), δ±, κ±, and ζ satisfy the KKT condition (A.5). Thus,
(pˆ, dˆ) is the optimal solution of problem (6) and is unique.
When A1 holds, problem (6) is also feasible and has a
unique optimal solution (pˆ, dˆ) as well as an optimal dual so-
lution (δˆ±, κˆ±, ζˆ ), which together satisfy (A.5). Let µ±i = δˆ
±
i ,
η±i = κˆ
±
i , and
bi = dˆi− pˆi+aζˆ (A.7)
Then (pˆ, dˆ,b) and (µ±,η±) satisfy (A.3)-(A.4), which implies
(pˆ, dˆ,b) is a GNE.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Note that A2 implies A1. For prosumer i, given other
prosumers’ strategies (p¯−i, d¯−i, b¯−i), it can choose pi = pˇi,
di = dˇi and bi = ∑ j 6=i b¯ j/(I − 1), so that −aλ + bi = 0 and
Γi(pi,di,bi, p¯−i, d¯−i, b¯−i) = Ji(pˇ, dˇ). Since prosumer i aims at
minimizing its net cost at GNE, we have
Ji(pˇi, dˇi)≥ Γi(pˆ, dˆ, bˆ)
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Suppose (8) holds with equality for all i. Adding (4a) over all
i ∈ I leads to:
I
∑
i=1
Γi(pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) =
I
∑
i=1
Ji(pˆi, dˆi) (B.1)
Thus, ∑i∈I Ji(pˇi, dˇi) = ∑i∈I Ji(pˆi, dˆi). The uniqueness of opti-
mal solution of (6) implies (pˇ, dˇ) = (pˆ, dˆ).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Part I: Prove (10), i.e.,
PoA(G) = J
(
pˆ(I), dˆ(I)
)
J
(
p˜(I), d˜(I)
) ≥ 1− C
I−1 .
For simplicity, without causing ambiguity, the I in
(pˆ(I), dˆ(I)) and (p˜(I), d˜(I)) are omitted here. According to
Proposition 1, (pˆ, dˆ) is the optimal solution of (6). Denote
Ω(p,d) := ∑i∈I(di − pi)2, S := {(pi,di),∀i ∈ I : s.t. (6b)−
(6d) are satisfied.} Note that S is also the feasible set for
problem (1).
For every strategy combination s = (p,d,b) ∈ S, there is:
I
∑
i=1
Γi(p,d,b) =
I
∑
i=1
Ji(pi,di) = J(p,d) (C.1)
which in particular holds for every GNE (pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) and every
(p∗,d∗,b∗) ∈ argmins∈S∑Ii=1Γi(s). Moreover, one can estab-
lish equivalence between the set of all subvectors (p,d) in
strategy space S and the feasible set S of problem (1), so
there must be (p∗,d∗) = (p˜, d˜). Then PoA can be equivalently
written as
PoA(G) = J(pˆ, dˆ)
J(p˜, d˜)
(C.2)
Obviously |Ω(p,d)| ≤C1I,∀(p,d) ∈ S, where
C1 := sup
{
|pi−di|2, |pi−di|2,∀i ∈ I
}
is independent from I by the uniform bound assumption on
pi, pi, di, di for all i ∈ I. By definition, we have
J(p˜, d˜)≤ J(pˆ, dˆ) (C.3)
and
J(p˜, d˜)+
Ω(p˜, d˜)
2a(I−1) ≥ J(pˆ, dˆ)+
Ω(pˆ, dˆ)
2a(I−1) (C.4)
so that
J(pˆ, dˆ)≤ J(p˜, d˜)+ Ω(p˜, d˜)
2a(I−1) −
Ω(pˆ, dˆ)
2a(I−1)
≤ J(p˜, d˜)+ C1I
a(I−1) (C.5)
When A2 and A3 hold, we have J(p˜, d˜)≤ J(pˇ, dˇ)≤C2I < 0,
where
C2 := sup
{
fi(pˇi)−ui(dˇi),∀i ∈ I
}
(C.6)
is independent from I by the uniform bound assumption on
fi(.), ui(.) for all i ∈ I. Thus
1−PoA(G) = J(pˆ, dˆ)− J(p˜, d˜)|J(p˜, d˜)|
≤ C1I/a(I−1)|C2|I
=
C
I−1 (C.7)
where C :=C1/(a|C2|).
Part II: Prove (11), i.e.,
lim
I→∞
|pˆi(I)− p˜i(I)|= lim
I→∞
∣∣dˆi(I)− d˜i(I)∣∣= 0, ∀i ∈ I.
Sketch of proof. We notice that the difference between
KKT conditions of problems (1) and (6) only lies in the
term di−pia(I−1) in stationarity equations (A.5a)–(A.5b). Due
to the uniform bound assumption we made on pi, pi, di,
di, this difference will diminish as prosumer number I
increases to infinity. Based on this observation, we can bound
the difference between solutions of the two sets of KKT
conditions, i.e., between the optimal solutions of problems
(1) and (6), and show that this difference also diminishes
as I increases to infinity. Please see below for a detailed proof.
Full proof. The centralized social optimal problem (1)
can be equivalently solved by its KKT condition:2
f˙i(pi)−λm−δ−i +δ+i = 0,∀i ∈ I (C.8a)
−u˙i(di)+λm−κ−i +κ+i = 0,∀i ∈ I (C.8b)
I
∑
i=1
pi =
I
∑
i=1
di (C.8c)
0≤ δ−i ⊥ (pi− pi)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (C.8d)
0≤ δ+i ⊥ (pi− pi)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (C.8e)
0≤ κ−i ⊥ (di−di)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (C.8f)
0≤ κ+i ⊥ (di−di)≥ 0,∀i ∈ I (C.8g)
All the equations in (C.8) except (C.8c) define the optimal
production pi and consumption di in response to a given dual
variable λm as the following functions, for all i ∈ I:
pi = f˜i(λm) :=

( f˙i)−1(λm), if f˙i(pi)< λm < f˙i(pi)
pi, if λm ≤ f˙i(pi)
pi, if λm ≥ f˙i(pi)
di = u˜i(λm) :=

(u˙i)−1(λm), if u˙i(di)< λm < u˙i(di)
di, if λm ≤ u˙i(di)
di, if λm ≥ u˙i(di)
By our assumptions on fi(.), ui(.), for all i∈ I, functions f˜i(.)
and −u˜i(.) are well defined and monotonically increasing on
λm ∈ R. By (C.8c), λ˜m is a dual optimal solution of problem
(1) if and only if it solves the following equation:
I
∑
i=1
(
f˜i(λ˜m)− u˜i(λ˜m)
)
= 0.
We next look at KKT condition (A.5) which equivalently
characterizes primal-dual optimal solutions of problem (6).
2For convenience, we slightly abuse the notation by denoting capacity-
associated dual variables as (δ±,κ±) for both problems (1) and (6).
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Specifically, all the equations in (A.5) except (A.5c) define
the optimal pi and di in response to a given dual variable ζ as
functions f oi (ζ ) and uoi (ζ ), respectively, for all i∈I. Although
closed-form expressions of f oi (.) and u
o
i (.) are hard to derive,
we can establish their relationships with f˜i(.) and u˜i(.), for all
i ∈ I:
pi = f oi (ζ ) = f˜i
(
ζ +
di− pi
a(I−1)
)
di = uoi (ζ ) = u˜i
(
ζ +
di− pi
a(I−1)
)
Besides, when f oi (ζ ) ∈ (pi, pi) and uoi (ζ ) ∈ (di,di) are both
satisfied, the following equation holds for all i ∈ I:
f˙i ( f oi (ζ )) = ζ +
uoi (ζ )− f oi (ζ )
a(I−1) = u˙i (u
o
i (ζ ))
Taking its derivative over ζ , and combining the cases where
capacity constraints are binding, we get for all i ∈ I:
f˙ oi (ζ ) =

1
f¨i(pi)
[
1+ 1a(I−1) ·
(
1
f¨i(pi)
− 1u¨i(di)
)] , if pi < pi < pi
0, otherwise
u˙oi (ζ ) =

1
u¨i(di)
[
1+ 1a(I−1) ·
(
1
f¨i(pi)
− 1u¨i(di)
)] , if di < di < di
0, otherwise
where pi = f oi (ζ ) and di = uoi (ζ ). By our assumptions on fi(.),
ui(.), for all i∈ I, functions f oi (.) and −uoi (.) are well defined
and monotonically increasing on ζ ∈R. By the power balance
constraint (A.5c), ζˆ is a dual optimal solution of problem (6)
if and only if it solves the following equation:
I
∑
i=1
(
f oi (ζˆ )−uoi (ζˆ )
)
= 0.
Let λ˜m be any dual optimal solution of problem (1), so that
p˜i = f˜i(λ˜m), d˜i = u˜i(λ˜m) for all i ∈ I constitute the (unique)
primal optimal solution of problem (1). We next show that
there must be a dual optimal solution ζˆ of problem (6) which
lies near λ˜m. For that purpose, we denote
p := sup{pi, ∀i ∈ I} , p := inf
{
pi, ∀i ∈ I
}
d := sup
{
di, ∀i ∈ I
}
, d := inf{di, ∀i ∈ I}
which all exist and are independent from I by our uniform
bound assumption. Define two numbers:
ζ+ := λ˜m+
p−d
a(I−1) ≥ ζ
− := λ˜m+
p−d
a(I−1) .
Indeed, there must be
f oi (ζ
+)−uoi (ζ+)≥ f˜i(λ˜m)− u˜i(λ˜m), ∀i ∈ I
which can be verified by assuming f oi (ζ+) − uoi (ζ+) <
f˜i(λ˜m)− u˜i(λ˜m) and deducing a contradiction:
f oi (ζ
+) = f˜i
(
ζ++
d+i − p+i
a(I−1)
)
≥ f˜i
(
ζ++
d˜i− p˜i
a(I−1)
)
≥ f˜i
(
ζ++
d− p
a(I−1)
)
= f˜i(λ˜m), ∀i ∈ I
where p+i = f
o
i (ζ+), d
+
i = u
o
i (ζ+), for all i ∈ I. Both in-
equalities above stem from monotonicity of f˜i(.). Similarly,
−uoi (ζ+) ≥ −u˜i(λ˜m) for all i ∈ I, and therefore f oi (ζ+)−
uoi (ζ+)≥ f˜i(λ˜m)− u˜i(λ˜m), which contradicts our assumption.
We hence further have
I
∑
i=1
(
f oi (ζ
+)−uoi (ζ+)
)≥ I∑
i=1
(
f˜i(λ˜m)− u˜i(λ˜m)
)
= 0.
Following the same procedure, we can also show
I
∑
i=1
(
f oi (ζ
−)−uoi (ζ−)
)≤ 0.
Due to monotonicity of function ∑Ii=1 ( f oi (.)−uoi (.)), there
must be ζˆ ∈ [ζ−,ζ+], such that ∑Ii=1
(
f oi (ζˆ )−uoi (ζˆ )
)
= 0,
i.e., ζˆ is a dual optimal solution of problem (6). Further,
pˆi = f oi (ζˆ ), dˆi = uoi (ζˆ ) for all i ∈ I constitute the (unique)
primal optimal solution of problem (6), which is also the
production and consumption profile at GNE.
To prepare for the final step of our proof, we point out
Lipschitz continuity of functions f˜i(.), u˜i(.) for all i ∈ I.
Specifically, due to the uniform bound assumption we made
on f¨i(.), u¨i(.), for all i ∈ I, there exists a positive constant γ ,
which is independent from I, such that∣∣ f˜i(x)− f˜i(y)∣∣≤ γ |x− y| , ∀i ∈ I, ∀x,y ∈ R
|u˜i(x)− u˜i(y)| ≤ γ |x− y| , ∀i ∈ I, ∀x,y ∈ R.
Denote σ := max
{|p−d|, |p−d|}/a. For any prosumer
number I, for all i ∈ I, we have:
|pˆi− p˜i| ≤
∣∣∣pˆi− f˜i(ζˆ )∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ f˜i(ζˆ )− p˜i∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ f˜i
(
ζˆ +
dˆi− pˆi
a(I−1)
)
− f˜i(ζˆ )
∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ f˜i(ζˆ )− f˜i(λ˜m)∣∣∣
≤ γ
∣∣∣∣∣ dˆi− pˆia(I−1)
∣∣∣∣∣+ γ ∣∣∣ζˆ − λ˜m∣∣∣
≤ γ · σ
I−1 + γ ·
σ
I−1 =
2γσ
I−1
where the second inequality applies Lipschitz continuity of
f˜i(.) and the last inequality exploits the fact that ζˆ ∈ [ζ−, ζ+].
To finish the proof, we apply the standard definition of
convergence. For arbitrary ε > 0, we can identify integer
Iε ≥ 2γσε +1, such that for all I ≥ Iε , we can make |pˆi− p˜i| ≤
2γσ
I−1 ≤ ε . This proves limI→∞ |pˆi− p˜i| = 0 for all i ∈ I. A
similar argument can prove limI→∞
∣∣dˆi− d˜i∣∣= 0 for all i ∈ I.
D. Proof of Lemma 1
The Hessian matrix of φ(y) is H(φ) =H1+H2+H3, where
H1 =

f¨1
−u¨1
. . .
f¨I
−u¨I

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H2 =

1
a(I−1)
−1
a(I−1)
−1
a(I−1)
1
a(I−1)
. . .
1
a(I−1)
−1
a(I−1)
−1
a(I−1)
1
a(I−1)

H3 =

−1
aI
1
aI . . .
−1
aI
1
aI
1
aI
−1
aI . . .
1
aI
−1
aI
...
...
...
...
−1
aI
1
aI . . .
−1
aI
1
aI
1
aI
−1
aI . . .
1
aI
−1
aI

The only non-zero eigenvalue of H2 is 2a(I−1) ,
corresponding to orthonormal eigenvectors ei =
[0 · · ·0
√
2
2
(2i−1)
−√2
2
(2i)
0 · · ·0]T ,∀i = 1 · · · I. The only non-zero
eigenvalue of H3 is − 2a , corresponding to unit eigenvector
e = [ 1√
2I
−1√
2I
· · · 1√
2I
−1√
2I
]T . When A4 holds, for any vector
x = [x11 x12 · · ·xi1 xi2 · · ·xI1 xI2]T ∈ R2I×1, we have
xTH(φ)x
= xT H1x+ xT H2x+ xT H3x
=
I
∑
i=1
( f¨ix2i1− u¨ix2i2)+
2
a(I−1) (
√
2
2
)2
T
∑
i=1
(xi1− xi2)2
− 2
a
1
2I
(
I
∑
i=1
(xi1− xi2))2
≥
I
∑
i=1
( f¨ix2i1− u¨ix2i2)+
(
1
a(I−1) −
1
a
) T
∑
i=1
(xi1− xi2)2
=
I
∑
i=1
(
f¨ix2i1− u¨ix2i2−
I−2
a(I−1) (xi1− xi2)
2
)
≥
I
∑
i=1
(
f¨ix2i1− u¨ix2i2−
2I−4
a(I−1) (x
2
i1+ x
2
i2)
)
≥ 0 (D.1)
Therefore, H(φ) is a positive semidefinite matrix, implying
φ(y) is a convex function.
Suppose (pˆ, dˆ, bˆ) is an GNE of the game G, and λˆ :=
∑Ii=1 bˆi/(aI). According to the KKT condition (A.3) and the
convexity of φ(y), it is easy to check that (yˆ, λˆ ) satisfies
Lλ∈R(yˆ,λ )≤ L(yˆ, λˆ )≤ Ly∈Y(y, λˆ ) (D.2)
which means (yˆ, λˆ ) is a saddle point of L(y,λ ).
